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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES KINNE ,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16447

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, SUSAN WYNN, and THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE INSURANCE FUND

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff is seeking review of an

Orde~

of the Industrial

Conunission of Utah awarding workmen's compensation benefits to Susan
Wynn as the dependent widow of Max L. Wynn.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On March 27, 1979, the Industrial Commission entered a
final Order awarding Susan Wynn the statutorily prescribed death
benefits for the death of her husband Max L. Wynn, who was killed
while in the course and scope of his employment with Charles Kinne
and Freeport Transport, Inc.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff Charles Kinne is seeking to have the Order of
the Industrial commission set aside as it pertains to him personally.
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Defendant State Insurance Fund, as the workmen's compensation
insc::
for Freeport Transport, Inc., requests that the finding of joint 1

and several liability of Kinne be affirmed on review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to those facts set forth in the brief of
plaintiff Charles Kinne, and as a supplement thereto, defendant
State Insurance Fund would note that it is undisputed that Charles I
Kinne owned the vehicle in which Max L. Wynn was riding at the
time of his death, that Kinne was responsible for paying the
deceased his wages, and that Kinne both agreed by contract to
retain the right to hire and fire drivers for his trucks and
exercised that right in fact.
I

The State Insurance Fund has paid Susan Wynn the benefit:,
provided for in the Order of the Industrial Commission and expresse!
I

no opinion on plaintiff Kinne's assertion that Mr. Wynn was not
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his
death.

However, the Fund believes the finding of joint and

several liability between Kinne and Freeport Transport, Inc., shoul:
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. CHARLES KINNE WAS THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF MAX L. WYNN Ai~D
AS SUCH IS LIABLE TO HIS DEPENDENTS FOR THE STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED'.
I
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
The essential error in Mr. Kinne's assertion that he
was not the employer of Max L. Wynn at the time of his death stems
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from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the employeri employee relationship as it has been developed under Utah• s Workmen's

compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1, et seq.

(1953).

Our

statute, like most compensation legislation, contains no precise
or exhaustive definition of employment.

The basic definition of

"employer" is found in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (2)

(Supp. 1979),

which provides in relevant part that the term includes
Every person, firm and private corporation,
including every public utility, having in
service one or more workmen or operatives
regularly employed in the same business, or
in or about the same establishment, under
any contract of hire, express or implied,
oral or written
This admittedly vague definition has been interpreted
by this Court, since the inception of workmen's compensation, to

include all those employer-employee relationships which were
included within the traditional common law criteria for defining
a master and servant relationship.

In early cases decided under

the Act, this Court suggested the following tests for determining
who was a servant's employer in the absence of an express contract
of employment:

(1) who was responsible for the selection and

employment of the servant; (2) who paid the servant's wages; (3)
who had the power to discharge the servant; (4) who had control
over his actions; and (5) whose work was being done and who was
receiving the benefit of the servant's labors.

See Murray v.

Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929);

~

£aunty v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 71 P.2d 177 (1937}.
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Experience in other jurisdictions which had adopted
these same criteria for determining the existence

f th
o
e ernp loyrne:
relationship made it apparent that the beneficial goals of
workme:
compensation legislation were often undermined by a strict
applica
of such master and servant principles.
This resulted from the
unfortunate propensity of some of those engaged in various forms
of commerce to seek to avoid any responsibility to insure their
workers by characterizing those performing labor for them as
independent contractors.

Thus, a primary employer would contract

with another individual to secure the performance of certain tasks
this latter individual would provide the laborers, pay them from
his own revenues, direct them in most of the aspects of their
performance while at work and retain the power to discharge them.
In return, the secondary employer would receive a.specified sum
for completing the directed task.

All too often this type of

arrangement ended with the employee who was injured on the job
discovering both that he had no claim for compensation against
the primary employer because of the lack of incidents of the
normal master-servant relationship, and that the secondary employ;
had not procured insurance and had no assets available to satisfy
any civil judgment obtained.
To remedy this situation, almost all legislatures adopt'
the concept of "statutory" or constructive employer.

This desigr.

of certain primary employers, such as general.contractors, as
'b'
statutory employers dictated that such persons had the responsl·
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to ultimately guarantee that all workers over whom they had some
significant rights of supervision and control, and who were working
at tasks which were a part of the business of the primary employer,
were covered by the provisions of workmen's compensation.
As this Court noted, the purpose of such legislation
was:
to protect employees of minor contractors
against the possible irresponsibility of
their immediate employer, by making the
principle employer, who has general control
of the business in hand, liable as if he
had directly employed all who worked upon
any business which he has undertaken.
Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Utah 1977}.
In Utah, this remedial legislation was enacted by including
the following language in the section defining employers covered
by

the Act:
Where any employer procures work
to be done wholly or in part for him by
a contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and such work is
a part or process in the trade or business
of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any such subcontractors, shall
be deemed, within the meaning of this
section, employees of such original
employer.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1953).
As previously stated, the purpose of this legislation was
to benefit workmen by exi>anding their protection under the Act and
providing for compensation in situations where a true employeeemployer relationship did not exist.
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In the instant case, there was no express or impl~d
contract of hire between Max Wynn and Freeport Transport,

Inc,

However, there was a contract between Freeport and Kinne,

whereby
Kinne agreed to lease Freeport a tractor and trailer and provide
a driver for the unit.

Max Wynn was the driver.

There was no question that Freeport Transport exercised
enough control and supervision over Max Wynn to bring them within
the definition of employer contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(2)
(Supp. 1977), and this finding is not being challenged.

Kinne,

however, is seeking to be relieved of his compensation liability
because of Freeport Transport' s involvement in the matter.

Such

a ruling would be wholly inconsistent with the established princip:1
of workmen's compensation law.
Prof. Larson, in his treatise on Workman's Compensation

I

Law, has noted that a vast majority of states have enacted "contrai
under" provisions which impose on general employers a compensation
liability to the employees of contractors with whom they deal.

Wr.:I

the statutory pattern of these provisions vary, the general rule i'
that "the general contractor who has been required to pay compensa'• • . can obtain reimbursement from the subcontractor, unless they
have altered this normal pattern by specific agreement."

lB A.

Larson, workmen's Compensation Law §49.11 at 9-2

see also

(1979).

Blevins & Montgomery Builders, Inc. v. Gregory, 371 S.W.2d 942
(Ky. 1963); Jones v. Southern Tupelo Lumber Co., 257 La. 869, 244
So. 2 d 815

( 19 71) .
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Utah's statute is silent on the subject of whether a
general contractor is secondarily, jointly or primarily liable
for payment of compensation, but the State Fund would submit that
in the absence of any statutory enactment to the contrary,
employers' liability must be joint and several to insure the
broadest protection for employees and to encourage subcontractors
to comply with the mandate of the Compensation Act.
In this case, Kinne agreed contractually with Freeport
to provide workmen's compensation insurance for his driver, but
failed to do so.

If he were allowed to escape all financial

responsibility for this failure, it would be an invitation for
small contractors to intentionally avoid obtaining insurance for
their employees, in direct violation of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46
(1953) •

Plaintiff has cited cases which stand collectively for
the proposition that Freeport Transport exercised sufficient control
to be deemed an employer of Max Wynn.
disputed.

This contention is not being

However, there is nothing in plaintiff's brief or the

organic law of the State to suggest that Freeport's status as an
employer eliminates Kinne as an employer and extinguishes his
legal obligations.
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316
(Utah 1975), this Court indicated that
The main facts to be considered as bearing
on the [employment] relationship here a~e:
(1) whatever covenants or agreements exist
concerning the right of direction and
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con~rol.over the employee, whether express
or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire;
(3) the method of payment • . . ; and (4)
the furnishing of equipment.

538 P.2d at 318.
In the instant case, Kinne contracted with Freeport to
retain the exclusive right to control and direct Max Wynn; he had
the right both to hire and fire Wynn; he was responsible for
paying Wynn's wages, and he owned the truck and trailer Wynn used
in performing his duties.

Under any imaginable interpretationof

the facts here presented, Kinne was clearly an employer of Wynn.
His attempt to have this Court create a judicial exception to
an employer's compensation liability when there is found to exist
two parties who qualify as employers should be rejected in favor
of the more logical and equitable approach adopted by the Industr:
Commission of imposing joint and several liability.

It is not a

question of either/or; it is both.
Even if this Court were disposed to attempt to make a
comparison of the employers' actions to determine which should
exclusively bear the liability for compensation, application oft
tests set forth in the Ashton case, supra, would clearly point~
Kinne as the party to be considered exclusively liable.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has urged this Court to adopt a rule of law
providing that only one party can be deemed liable for an employi
compensation benefits.

Such a rule is without foundation in our
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statute, would be inconsistent with the practice in other
jurisdictions, and contrary to the unquestioned objective of
compensation legislation in providing the broadest coverage
possible to injured employees.

Plaintiff has provided no authority

for the proposition that there can be only one employer for compensation purposes and such a holding would encourage small contractors
to try to circumvent the requirements of state law that all
employers must provide compensation coverage for employees.

The

defendant State Insurance Fund therefore respectfully requests
that the Order of the Industrial Commission imposing joint and
several liability be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

--~-

day of September, 1979.

M. David Eckersley
Attorney for State Insurance Fund
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